Jecel Assumpcao Jr. wrote:
The really big decision point for Intel was if they
should continue to
evolve the 486 or go with the 860 instead. The 960 people wished it were
a three way race, but it wasn't and they saw their chip positoned as
"intelligent I/O" while the 860 got Unix ported to it.
The 960 had already lost all hope of being a general-purpose processor
by that time. The 960 was the BiiN/P7 processor, with the tag bit and
object-oriented operations desupported (and removed in some later
versions). It was originally intended to be the replacement of the iAPX
432, in that it was an attempt to take the good parts of the 432 but
ditch the complexities of the CISC architecture that were viewed as
being a substantial part of the performance problem. Rather than going
it alone, Intel partnered with Siemens, and the joint venture became
BiiN. It was a market failure, and the 960 came about as Intel tried to
salvage something from it. There was no significant push to make the
960 a general purpose processor, as that ship had already sunk.
Whether Intel *wanted* to evolve the 486 or the 860 is irrelevant. They
needed to make what customers wanted (and thus were willing to
purchase), and 99.99% of customers wanted a faster x86. That affected
the relative engineering resources that could be put into the followons
for the 486 and 860. It's similar to the reason that Intel did NOT get
clobbered in the DRAM business; without having an upper management edict
to exit DRAM, they had already effectively done so, because wafer starts
were allocated to products based on the profitability of those
products. (The previous sentence is the only one that I can back up
from an official source, which is Andy Grove's book
_Only the Paranoid
Survive_.)
Eric