A lot of the techniques described in the "NSA ANT Catalogue" [1] seem to be
based on exploiting the machine at the level of the BIOS/ROM monitor,
microcode, etc. Really very sneaky to compromise the hardware itself; it
often goes overlooked that firmware can be surreptitiously re-flashed, CPU
microcode surreptitiously modified, FPGAs reprogrammed... you really start
to question your confidence in _any_ hardware... maybe it's all been pre
compromised for mass surveillance before it even gets into our hands...
certainly select bits of equipment are [2]. Reload the software, heck, even
go and try to re-flash the monitor thinking you are being thorough, only to
be hit with the thought that the CPU itself could be irreversibly
compromised. It certainly gives one an appreciation for the straightforward
old minicomputer implemented with all discrete components... at least you
can get in there and see what's going on, convince yourself, LOL!
I don't want this to go into OT political territory but I for one am
grateful that guys like Snowden come forward... As an engineer and IT pro,
reading about what is really going on out there, it's a real slap in the
face; really wakes you up.
Best,
Sean
[1]
https://www.aclu.org/files/natsec/nsa/20140130/NSA's%20Spy%20Catalogue.…
[2]
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/photos-of-an-nsa-upgrade-factory…
On Fri, Jul 25, 2014 at 1:24 PM, Rob Doyle <radioengr at gmail.com> wrote:
On 7/25/2014 3:56 AM, jwsmobile wrote:
The mechanism in the Pentium was almost open compared to what is there
now. All of this is under heavy NDA as far as it
even being there, and
it may or may not be these days.
It has been widely speculated (and supported by the Snowden documents)
that the NSA can defeat the Intel random number generator - and therefore
any crypto based on that RNG) with a microcode patch.
Microcode patches - it's not just for /fixing/ bugs...
Rob