Supposedly, non-clocked logic can also offer
greater security because
there's no clock signal for remote sensors to key on when trying to
sense what the CPU is doing. This seemed a little odd to me. Do
espionage types really try to sense what a processor is doing
remotely, based on the EM emissions from the chip?
Don't know about processors, but Tempest had a proof of concept for intercepting I/O
from kbd/video.
(Anyone else remember Tempest? for a while they were selling big "tinfoil hat"
type shields for monitors and then, suddenly,
it went away.) Was that NSA that came up with the POC?
P.S. - for the U.S. types - never would have thought it 15 years ago, but NSA now has
official mousepads you can buy.
I think the *monitor* is the biggest (and easiest) "leak" to tap.
IIRC, in the UK they have mobile units that wander around trying
to see how many televisions each home has (?)