On 7/25/2014 4:28 PM, Eric Smith wrote:
If you're referring to Intel x86 parts, you are
incorrect. The
mechanism is there, and it is routinely used.
Try to put some code of your own in
there. All of those updates are
encrypted. W/o being Intel and encoding and encrypting updates now you
can't install microcode anymore.
These are the updates I referred to that are routinely added to Bios to
be installed automatically, so you don't need to do it with a tool like
this.
Once various chips would make the street, a rollup patch would be sent
to the bios development groups I knew of and they'd be incorporated into
the bios to be loaded based on each processor id as needed.
The P3's up to the coppermine always seemed to have a lot of issues, but
as what became the Core type processors came out less so.
the P4 had some while I worked on it, but less than the P3s. Some
shipped parts barely worked w/o an update.
If you can encrypt and code a patch, then you have access to internal
Intel tools and documentation I won't even describe to code them. I
don't know if the NSA or others outside Intel could compromise that, but
it would require doing it around the time the chip shipped, not
something that could be done and assumed to be distributed to systems
much after that time.
I don't know a lot of people who do chip code updates, but if they
update their Bios, in my experience it is usually while the system is
relatively new.
Compromising and reflashing the Bios based on the motherboard is another
matter and is sufficent to do anything that one could do to the
microcode. The bios which is compromised would have to be such that it
installed it and concealed its presence. There may be some bios
compromise kits in the wild, have not checked the sites that scan for
such. They most likely would be very difficult to detect by signature
if done correctly once installed in the bios.
Jim