On 9/10/24 17:37, Maciej W. Rozycki via cctalk wrote:
On Tue, 10 Sep 2024, Paul Koning via cctalk wrote:
Any
special provenance? (Hitler's personal Enigma?, BillG's' Altair?,
Steve's Apple?)
Nope. But the Enigma is a four-rotor Navy model, not the more
common
3-rotor one. I didn't know that the Navy had those; I had heard of
4-rotor machines only as something the Gestapo used.
There is one Navy model on
display at Bletchley Park FWIW, along with the
story behind the expansion.
The army version only had 3 rotors because the Germans
figured army messages would be useful only for a short time
(move to next bridge over river) and useless after an hour
or so. the Germans knew that the Enigma was a weak system,
so they figured they needed better for the navy (meet sub
tender at 9AM at coordinates XY) as the messages could be of
use by the time they were broken.
The Germans apparently had no idea that the allies put
together a MASSIVE mechanized code breaking effort.
Bletchley Park had 6 bombes of the Turing design, but the US
had 360 machines made by NCR under insane secrecy. If you
saw the movie "The Imitation Game" the model they showed was
pretty accurate. It tried about 24 combinations per second,
and took quite a while to find the starting position for the
navy code. The NCR machines ran so fast that when they got
a match they had to brake to a stop and back up to record
the match. The British bombe rang a bell and stopped when
it got a selected level of a partial match, the NCR machine
recorded the match on adding machine tape and then continued
trying the rest of the possible combinations. it tried 1440
combinations/second, and could break the navy code in under
20 minutes, the army code in six minutes.
The code was changed every midnight, so for the first
message of the day the code breakers had to guess which
rotors were to be used that day. There were 7 rotors, you
picked either 3 or 4 for army or navy respectively. In the
US, they set up 26 machines (I think) with all possible
combinations of rotors and then found the starting position
of the only one that came out right. Then, once they knew
which rotors to use, they re-set all 360 machines to that
arrangement and cracked the starting position of 360
messages in parallel. The messages were sent by underwater
cable to the US for cracking from various intercept sites.
For higher level message traffic, the Germans had the Lorenz
SZ42 (Schlussel Zusatz, literally key attachment, but
meaning cypher attachment) which was a VERY strong (for the
time) modern encryption device. But, it too, had a
weakness. The Bletchely Park guys had intercepts of this
system that they codenamed "Tunny" and the sender and
recipient were indicated in clear text, so they knew this
was important stuff. The machine had rotors that had
different numbers of steps, related by prime numbers, so
that the cryptoperiod was quite long. One rotor of each
group could either XOR one serial data bit of the Teletype
character, or not alter it. There were two groups of 5
rotors. Each rotor had "bumps" that could be flipped up or
down. One group of rotors advanced one step for each
character, the other group advanced intermittently,
determined by two other rotors. Bletchely Park NEVER saw
one of these machines, but by MASSIVE statistical analysis,
they managed to figure out completely how it worked, which
blows me away! They built an electronic code cracking
machine that ran two paper tapes that differed in length by
one character, and as the tapes ran through the reader
repeatedly, this managed to compare every character of the
ciphertext against every character of the crib tape, and the
machine accumulated some statistical information from that.
This machine was called "Colossus".
One of the huge cracks they got was a long message from Gen.
Erwin Rommel detailing what he thought were the strengths
and weaknesses of the allied positions. We used that to
take advantage of what we thought the Germans would do to
exploit that.
Another big crack was an Irish navy officer had been killed,
and with his family's permission, papers with disinformation
on the D-day attack were put in his pockets. Tunny
intercepts later showed the Germans were moving positions
based on this disinformation, and it helped the invasion go
better for the allies.
Jon